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Epistemic merit, autonomy, and testimony

Vega Encabo, Jesús (2008) Epistemic merit, autonomy, and testimony. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 23 (1). pp. 45-56. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

In this paper, it is argued that both the informer and the hearer in a testimonial situation deserve epistemic merit insofar as they contribute to the collaborative achievement of sharing knowledge. The paper introduces a distinction between the ideals of self-sufficiency and epistemic autonomy. The autonomous exercise of our epistemic agency is very often carried out under strong conditions of epistemic dependence. Testimony exhibits a kind of social dependence that does not threaten the autonomy of the subjects that need to consider their own epistemic capacities. When involved in a testimonial situation, both speaker and hearer declare, at least implicitly, the standings they occupy in an epistemic space and are obliged to recognise certain epistemic requirements.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Vega Encabo, Jesúsjesus.vega@uam.es
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: merit, testimony, epistemic autonomy, virtue epistemology, epistemic perspective
Depositing User: Users 15304 not found.
Date Deposited: 28 Feb 2014 00:35
Last Modified: 28 Feb 2014 00:35
Item ID: 10404
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL: http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi...
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.5
Date: January 2008
Page Range: pp. 45-56
Volume: 23
Number: 1
ISSN: 2171-679X
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10404

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