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Is the subjective interpretation of quantum probabilities really inconsistent?

Farmakis, Lefteris (2008) Is the subjective interpretation of quantum probabilities really inconsistent? THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 23 (2). pp. 163-173. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

Christopher Fuchs has recently offered a provocative version of quantum mechanical realism, which is based on the suggestion that quantum probabilities merit a subjective interpretation. His proposal, how-ever, has been charged with inconsistency by Amit Hagar (2003), who argues that interpreting quantum probabilities subjectively is inconsistent with the realist claims Fuchs wants to maintain for the quantum system and the dimensionality of the Hilbert space that accompanies it. In this paper I first outline the fun-damentals of Fuchs’s approach and then take up the task of rebutting Hagar’s charge by demonstrating the internal coherence of Fuchs’s realism.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Farmakis, LefterisE.Farmakis@lse.ac.uk
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: Bayesianism, measurement problem, incompleteness of the quantum formalism, wave-function, collapse postulate, realism
Depositing User: Users 15304 not found.
Date Deposited: 28 Feb 2014 00:30
Last Modified: 28 Feb 2014 00:30
Item ID: 10394
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL: http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi...
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.393
Date: November 2008
Page Range: pp. 163-173
Volume: 23
Number: 2
ISSN: 2171-679X
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10394

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