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Construction and Cognition

Elgin, Catherine Z (2009) Construction and Cognition. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 24 (2). pp. 135-146. ISSN 2171-679X

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The Structure of Appearance presents a phenomenalist system, constructing enduring visible objects out of
qualia. Nevertheless Goodman does not espouse phenomenalism. This is not because he considers his system
inadequate. Although details remain to be filled in, he considers his system viable. And he believes his constructional methods could readily yield extensions to other sensory realms. Why isn’t Goodman a phenomenalist?
This paper suggests an answer that illuminates Goodman’s views about the nature and functions of constructional systems, the prospects of reductionism, and the character of epistemology. These non-standard views present attractive alternatives to currently popular positions.

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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Elgin, Catherine
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: Nelson Goodman, construction, reduction, phenomenalism, constructional systems
Depositing User: Users 15304 not found.
Date Deposited: 24 Feb 2014 22:45
Last Modified: 24 Feb 2014 22:45
Item ID: 10363
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL:
DOI or Unique Handle:
Date: May 2009
Page Range: pp. 135-146
Volume: 24
Number: 2
ISSN: 2171-679X

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