Ivanova , Milena (2011) Friedman's Relativised A Priori and Structural Realism: In Search of Compatibility. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science , 25.
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Abstract
In this article I discuss a recent argument due to Dan McArthur, who suggests that the charge that Michael Friedman's relativised a priori leads to irrationality in theory change can be avoided by adopting structural realism. I provide several arguments to show that the conjunction of Friedman's relativised a priori with structural realism cannot make the former avoid the charge of irrationality. I also explore the extent to which Friedman's view and structural realism are compatible, a presupposition of McArthur's argument. This compatibility is usually questioned, due to the Kantian aspect of Friedman's view, which clashes with the metaphysical premise of scientific realism. I argue that structural realism does not necessarily depend on this premise and as a consequence can be compatible with Friedman's view, but more importantly I question whether Friedman's view really implies mind dependence.
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| Item Type: | Published Article or Volume | ||||||
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| Keywords: | Michael Friedman, Relativized a Priori, Structural Realism, Scientific Realism, Theory Change | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Structure of Theories General Issues > Theory Change |
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| Depositing User: | Dr Milena Ivanova | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 21 Jun 2011 11:22 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 21 Jun 2011 11:22 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 8680 | ||||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | International Studies in the Philosophy of Science | ||||||
| Publisher: | Routledge | ||||||
| Official URL: | http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all~co... | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Structure of Theories General Issues > Theory Change |
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| Date: | March 2011 | ||||||
| Volume: | 25 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8680 |
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